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0RIGiI OF T-I] 2P3? Tfj CF -;UITY A'M EELIEF TTLRZ IN ON
THE GROUND OF CONS ''1-CTT7T' -IiiAU]_
First,-- Equity is L branch of rmedial jastice -founded u-pon
principles of ri-,it, equa1ity, and morlity, as expland
promulgated in the decisions of its courts and it has the
capacity of growth in the direction of its settled principles.
In the broad sense in which t*tis term is sometimes used,
it signifies ntural justice.
In a more liY.itc6 it, qlicatjo:-, t , cts 1 . ustice
between contending par-ties. This is the moral significa-
tion, in reference to the rights of parties havincg conflictig
claims; but ay)-lied to courts and their jurisdiction and
proccedingrs, it has a more restrainecd &nd liite' significa-
tion.
One division of courts,, is into Courts of Law, and
Courts -of Equity. And Equity, in this relation and applica-
tion, is a br'anch of rumdial justice by and through :zhich
relief is afforded to suitors in its Courts.
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The difference betwen tho remedial justice of the courts
of co-mon law and that of the courts of equity is marked and
material. That administord by the courts of law is limited
by the principles of the common .!a,' , (which are to a great
extent positive. and inflexible ), and especially by the nature
and character of the process and pleadings, and of the judg-
ments which those courts can render; because the pleadings
cannot fully present all the matters in controversy, nor can
the judgments be adapted to the especial exigencies which may.
exist in particular case~s. It is not uncommon, also, for
cases to'fail in those courts, from the fact that too few or
too nany persons have been joined as parties, or because the
pleadings have not been framed with sufficient technical pre-
cision.
The remedial process of the courts of Equity, on the
other hand, admits, and generally requires that all persons
having an interest shall be made parties, and makes a large
allowance for amendments by summoning and discharging parties
after commencement of suit.
The plcadings are usually framed s; as to present to the
consideration of the court the whole case, witl its possible
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legal rights, and al'L its equities,-- that is, all the groundk
upon which the suitor is or is not entitled to relief upon
the principles of Equity-- And its final remOdial process
may be so varied as to muect tlio requirements of these equities
in cascs.where the juriidiction of the courts of equity
exists, by commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is
wrong. In other words its final process is varied so as to
enable the courts to do that equitable justice between the
parties that the case demands, either by copnanding what is
to be done, or prohibiting what is threatened to be done.
The principles upon which, and the words and forms by
and through which justice is administered in the United
States, are derived to a great extent from those which were
in existence in England at the time of the settlement of this
country; and it is therefore important to a correct under-
standing of the nature and character of our own jurisprudence,
no* only to trace it baok to its in-roduction here on the
early settlement of the colonies, but also to trace the Eng-
lish jurisprudence from its earliest conception as the admin-
istration of law, founded in -rinciples, down to that period.
It is in this way that we are enabled to explain many
-4-
things ill Our own p>ractice which ';vould. otherwise be entirely
obscure. This is .articulc-rly true of the principles which
regulate the jurisdiction and practico of the courts of
Equity, and of the principoles of Equity as they are now ap-
plicd and administered in the courts of law which at the
present day have equitable jurisdiction conferred upon them
by statutes pafsed fr that purposc. And for the purpose
of a conpetent undorstanding of the Equity in England, it is
necessary to r(fc, to the orig-in of the equitable jurisdic-
tion there, and, to ltrae its history, inquiring upon what
pr nciples it was ori "inally founded, and how it has boen
enlarged and sustaired.
The study of E;Iuity Jurisprudence, therefore, comprises
an inquiry into the origin and history of the courts of equity
the distinctive principles upon vwhich jurisdalition in Equity
is founded; the nature, character, :?nd cextent of the juris-,
diction itself; its p.eculiar remedies; the rules and -uaxims
which regulate its .. ist utioa; its rwodI -process and
proceedings, and nodes of defence; and its rules of evidence
and -actice.
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-OL IGIN AID HISTCRY-
The Courts of Equity may be said to have their origin as
far back as 1327 to 13r7, where tho 'ing held the Great Court
in which he administered justice in person, with the assis-
tance of his spiritual advisor. The Chancellor.
Of the officers of this court the chancellor's was one
of great trust and confidence, next to the King himself; but
his duties do not distinctly appear at the present day.
On the introduction of seals, he had the keeping of the
King's seal, which he affiXed to charte:s and other instru-
ments. As writs eame into use, it was made his duty to
frame and issue them from his court, which as early as the
reign of Henry II. was known as the Chancery. And it is said
that he exercised at this period a sort of equitable juris-
diction by which he mitigated the rigor of the common law,-
to what extent is nct definitely known. He is spoken of as
one who "annuls unjust law:is, and executes the rightful com-
mands of the pious prince, and puts an end to what is injur-
ious to the people or to -,orals," which would fem a very
ample jurisdiction; but it seems probablc that this was
-0-
according to the authority or iroction of tho king, g '
from tule to tircj in r:uLaiun to particular cases. He was
a principle member of the kings court, after the conquest, in
which, among other thin, s, all applications for the zpecial
exercise of the prerogative in regard to iatters of judicial
cognizance were discussed and decided upon.
In connection with the council, he (_xercised a separate
authority in cases in which the council directed the suitors
to proceed in Chancery. The court of Chancery is said to
have sprung from this council. But it may be said. that it
had its origin in the nr+rogative of the King, by which he
undertook to administer justice, on petition to himself, with-
out regard to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, which
he did through orders to h'is charcellor.
The great council or parliant also se:-t matters re-
lating to the Kiity's grants, etc., to the chancery; and it
seems that the chancellor, although an ecclesiastic, was the
principal actor as regards the judicial business which the
select or Kings council, as well a. the great council, had
to advise upon or transact.
In the time of ) dvarQ III. proccld-g in Chancery wore
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Co0Menccd by petition or bill, the Ivrsc party was svrmnoncd
the parties were examined, and Chancery appears as a distinct
court for -'Ivi relief in c%'ao vhich required extraordinary
remedies, the kin- having, by a rit referred all such matters
as were of grace to be dispatched by the Cha-cellor or by the
keeper of the privy seal.
It raay bc considered as fully cstablished as a separate
and permanent jurisdiction from the 17th. year of Richard II.
In the time of Edward IV. the chancery had come to be
regarded as one of t'm rCP , i.~ci-,Pal courts of the kingdom.
From this time its jurisdiction :d progress of its jurisdict-
ion becomes of ,1ore im'portance to us.
It is the tendancy of any legal system, when reduced to
a -practical 81lication, to fail of affecting such justice
between party and party, as the s-ecial circumstances of a-
case may require, by reason of the minuteness and inflexibil-
ity of its rules and the inability of the judges to adapt its
remedies to the necessities of the co-troversy under consid-
eration. This was the case vith the Roman Law; and to
remedy this defect, edicts wore issued from time to time,
which enabled the consuls and praetors to correct "1 the
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scrupulosity and mischievous suotloty of the 'Law," and from
these edicts a code of equitable jurispi- doncc was compiled.
So the principles and rules of the common law, as they were
reduced to practice became in their application the means of
injustice in cases where special equitable circumstances ex-
isled, of which the judgo could not take cognizance because
of the precise nature of its titles and rights, the inflex-
ible character of its pinciplos, and the technicality of
its pleadings and py'actice. And, in a manner somewhat
analagous to the Roman mode of modification, in order to
remedy such hardships, the prerog,-tive of the king or the
authority of the great council was exercised in ancient times
to procure a more equitable neasure of justice in the partic-
ular case, which .as accomolished through the Court of Chan-
cery.
This vias followed by the "invontion" of the writ of
subpoena, by noans of v:hich the chancery assumed, upon a
complaint made directly to that court, to require the attend-
ance of the acverse party, to a-1 swor to such matters as should
be objected against him. Notwithst(anding the complaints of
the commons, from time to time, that the course of proceeding
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in Chancery "was not according to the course of the common
law, but the p acticc of the holy church," the king sustained
the authority pf the chnuollor,.The right to issue the writ
was recognized and remulated by statute, ;zd other statutes
were passed confirming jurisdiction where it had not been
taken before.
In this way, without any compilation of a code, a system
of equitable jurisprudence was established in the court of
chancery enlarging from time to time, the decisions of the
court furnishing an exposition of its principles and of their
application.
Much of equity jurisprtdence exists inldependent of any
statute, and is founded upon an assumption of a power to do
equity, having its first inception in prerogative of the
king, and his commands to do justice in individual cases,
extending itself through the action of' the chancellor, to
the issue of a writ of summons to appear in his court without
any special auth.rity for that purpose and upon the return of
the subpoena, to the reception of a complaint, to a require-
ment upon the party sumnoned to make answer to that complaint,
or judgment upon the merits of the matters in controversy,
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according to the rules of equity and good conscience.
It apncars as a noticeable fact that the jurisdiction of
the chancery proceeded originally from, and was sustained by
successive kings of England against the repeated remonstancos
of the commons, who were aahuring to the conmon law. The
commons were jealous of the introduction by the ecclesiastics,
of the Roman Law, and in the reign of Richard II. the barons
protested that they would never suffer the kingdom to be
governed by the Roman Law, arnd the judges prohibited it from
being ant longer cited in the common law tribunals.t'
This opposition of the barons and the comn.on law judges
furnished very sufficient reasons why the chancellor should
not profess to adopt that law as the rule of decision.
In addition to this, it was not fitted, in many respects,
to the state of things existing in England; and so the chan-
cellors were of necessity comp0,lled to act upon oquitable
principles as expounded by themselves. In later times the
common law judges in that country have resorted to the Roman
Law for principles of decisions to a much greater extent than
they have given credit to it.
Since the time of Henry VIII. the Chancery Bench has
-ll-
been occupied by ::,one of the ablest lawyers which England has
produced, and they h,.V given to the proccodiiif,- and practice
in equity definite rules and forms, which leave litt~e to the
personal discretion of the ch-ncellor in determining what Oqu
equity and good consciencc require.
The °discretion of the chAanccllor is a judicial discretion
to be exercised according to the principle. and the practice
of the court.
The avowed princir)le upon which the jurisdiction was at
first exercised was the administration*of justice according
to honesty, equity, and conscience-- which last was unknown
to the common law as a principle of decision.
In the 15th. year of Richard II. two petitions addressed
to the King and the lords of parliament were sent to the chan-
cery to be heard, with the authority of parliameit, that," let
there be done that which right .nd reason and good faith and
good conscience domated in the case." These nay .e said
to be the general principles upon whicb equity is administered
at the present day.
- I
EQUITY JURISDICTICN.
It would be -next to an impossibility to reduce a juris-
diction so extensive and :f such diverse component parts to a
rigid and precise classification. But suffice it to say
that where the courts of law do not recognizc any right, and
therefore could give no remedy, but where the courts of equity
recognize equitable rights and could of course give equitable
relief, its jurisdiction exists. Also where the courts
of equity administer equitable relief for the infraction of
legal rights, in cases in which the Courts of law, recognizing
the right, give a remedy according to their principles, modes
and forms, but the remeldy is deemed by equity inadequate to
the requirements of the cEsc.
This class embraces fraud, mistake, accident, adminis-
tration, legacies, conttibution, and cases where justice and
conscionce requiro, the cancellation or reformation of instru-
ments, or the rescission, or the specific performance of
contracts. The courts of law relieve against fraud, mistake,
and accident where a remedy can be had according to their
modes and forms; but there are many cases in :,-,hich the legal
remedy is inadequate for the purposes of justice, and herein
of--- ---- Constructive Fraud.----
Constructive fraud in Erjuity is a term descriptive of
certain acts and contracts which equity regards as wrongful
and for which its courts give e th e or similar relief as
that granted in cases of actual -Fraud.
The cases of constructive fraud may be gathered under the
following heads:
First:(a), Fraud may be apparent from the intrinsic nature
and subject of the bargain itself, such as no man in his
senses and not-under delusion would make, on the one hand,
and no honest or fair man would accept on the other.
Fraud may be inferred from the terms of the pontract, as
inadequacy of consideration without proof of fraud; ordinar-
ily this is not the case, but if the inadequacy shocks the
court, tlen fraud nay be inferred, if considered, in connect-
ion with old age, r:c11tal weakness, or pecuniary necessity,
equity will grant relief.
In Shaddle v. Eisborough, 310 N.J.Eq.,370, Where a person
-14-
agrees to exch.-, his f'-m for city lots, but made no effort
to ascertain their value, and there was no misrepresentation
by the owner. OCr a bill for specific performance he set gp
as a defense that they wer'rc worth less than he su-posed.
Their v-lue not being so inadequate as to be evidence of
fraud,. Held, that the dofenso not -.)reJva
Also in the c:asc of DaviCdon v. Little, 22 Pa."Ot.,245,
a conveyance of'lied, free from actual fr'InK., is not void
merely because the -i-rice ivas :hokingly inadequate. Though
an unexec.-uted contract will not be enforced' in 2 court of
equity, if it seems to be unconscionable, yet after it is
exeuted by the parties, it 'will not bc declared void on that
ground alone, except in the case of an heir expectant.
Gross inadequacy of' price it only evidc. of fraud.
But even if the conveyance were -oid for gross inade-
quacy of -iico, it c -n. not be dispiuted 'y mere possessors of
the land without title, neither the party who conveyed nor
any Cne clairmin under hira, nor his creditors disputing it.
Harrison v. Guest, 6 De.Gex, IA.& G.,424 is a very illus-
trative case. An old man seventy one years of' age, bed-
ridden, illiterate, without any independent profe:sional
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advice and without consultinz his friends or relatives, con-
veyed property worth 400#,r. for the consideration of being
provided with board and lodging during the rest of his life.
He lived only six weeks after making the conveyance, his
representatives sought to have the conveyance set aside.
The evidence showed that he had refused to employ pro-
fessional advice for hirsclf, that he was able to understand
the nature of the transaction, and that there were no circum-
stances of oppression; the court held that there was not
sufficient ground to impeach the conveyamce.
In Scovill v. Barney, 4 Or., 288, The court said that
inadequacy of --rice or mental weakness standing alone, will
not warrant the interposition of equity, but when both are
combined, relief will be granted,. It is, perhaps, not possibl
to reconcile this naked proposition with the authorities.
(b). Contracts stipulating usury are constructively
fraudulently.
The policy of -prohibitin7 usury has, generally, been
abandoned, and the Statutes concerning it repealed, in Eng-
land and in severcrl of thu Ar-orican Sttos.
In some cf the states which still adhere to the policy,
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the usurious contract itself, the instrument by which it is
evidenced, and all its securities, are doclared to be utterly
void, in others, the stipulation for the usurious excess over
the legal interest is alone made void; while in other states
a further penalty is added to this usurious excess.
(c). So all gaming and wager agreements are constructive-
ly fraudulent. Although at common law certain kinds of
con+racts, based upon wagers, were not unlawful, while those
made upon a gaming consideration were illegal.
The modern legislation of England and the United States
declares all gaming and wagerfing agreements, and the instru-
ments by which they are evidenced, or secured, to be illegal,
null and void.
(d). Likewise all contracts in restraint of marriage are
fraudulent as being contrary to public policy.
The lavi of England and the United States regard marriage
relation as the very foundation of society. Since the true
conception of marriage assumes and requires a perfectly free
consent and union of the two spoicos, Equity has, from its
earliest )eriod, treated all agreements, executory or executed
between the immediate parties, or between third persons which
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might cUrectly or indirectly interfere in any degree with
this absolute freedom, either by promoting or restraining mar-
riage, as opposed to public *olicy and illegal and has there-
fore declared them null and void.
Analogous to marriame brokerage contracts, and depending
upon the same reasons, are agreements to pay a compensation to
a person for using his influence with a testator to procure
a will, devise, or bequest to be made in favor of the promisor.
(e). Contracts in general restraint of trade are con-
structively fraudulent as being inconsistent with the general
policy of te law. Unreasonableness in such contracts is
the crit+erion. But agreements in partial restraint of
trade are enforceable if reasonableand entered into for
valuable consideration.
In the cac of HRibbard v. Miller, 27 Mich.,15, the
court said, " Contracts in restraint of trade, which, consid-
ered with reference to the situation, business and objects of
the parties, and in the light of all the surrounding circum-
stances, appear to have been made for a just and honest pur-
pose and for the protection of legitimate interests, and are
reasonable as between the -parties and not specially injurious
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to the y ublic, wilL be upheld, an the weight or effect to be
given to the uis not --f-'ec'ed by any
presum ption for or "W'i.st the vali.ity of the restriction.
Such Ccntix~cts, if unobjectionable in other respects, require
no greator pecuniary or valuable consideration to support
them than any other contr.oi; and if in other
respects, no amount of pecuniry considr,''tion wilI render
them valid.
"Where one who is en-a-ed in any branch of musiness,pur-
chases the business .id'. stock of another engaged in the samie
branch of business, on the condit ion that the vendor shall
not further carry on this urtic. ar branch of business
within a reasonable extent of territory, such restraint of
trade, being reasonable and fTc.ir between the parties will be
enforced; and the fact that the -rice raid does not exceed
the cost of the :o 1 ... d d es not affect the validity
of the contract.
(f). All contracts to control official conduct are ille-
gal and a7ainst public policy.
In th2 case of vieguirc . Co win, ii Otto, 103, the
action was b seod on a contract bett,7een A. and B. whereby in
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consideration of A's procuring D" : roi.; o.1t as speciai
counsel in certain causes against the Unitc' Sotc-s, and-id-
ing hire. in managing the 'ofe-nco, of then, T agrees that he
will :.y A. one-1all of the fee which he _ay receive from the
govern.,c i:t. In dcliveri-7 the opinion of the court, 1.,r.
Justice ;waync said" " The law touching contracts like the
one here in qucstioh, has been often ceonsidered by this court,
and is well settled by our adjudications-- It cannot be
necessary to go over tic same ground again. To do so wot.ld
be a wraste of tinc. The object of this opinion is rather to
vnd-icate the aplication of our fcrrr rulings to this record
than to give them non, swuyort. They cd o Lot e, . it.
Frauds of this ol.ss to Thinch the her disclosed be-
longs are an unmixed evU. Vhether forbiden by statute or
condemned by -public policy, the result is the same. No
legal 2J1.;,i'-i' _% -n from such a source. They are the
.:.ers ad r. irs of the -ublic welfare, and of free govern-
ment as well. The lticr dp, -l o for its vitality upon the
virtue and oc' fL ith of those for y:>ci it (,xists, and of t
those for 'Thor it is arintstered. Corruption is always the
forerunner of des-otisi.t
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In Trist v. ChilCs, 21 Wallace, 441, The court said: while
recognizing the validity of an honest claim for services
honestly rendered. But they are blended and confused with
those which are forbidden," the whole is a unit, and indivis-
ible. That which is ba. destroys that which is good, and
they perish togethQr ------ Where the tai'nt exists it affect
fatally, in all its -arts, the entirc body of the contract.
Where there is turpitude, the law will help neither party."
These remarks apply here. The contract is clearly illegal,
and this action was brought to enforce it. The case being'!
fatally and fundamentally defective, he could not recover. "
(g). Agreements which stipulate for private services to
be rendered by dealing with individual legislators, privately
or personally are against public policy and void. Our law
permits a private citizen to endeavor to influence a legis-
lature, and to obtain the enactment of a statute, in anopen,
public ma -ner, by arguments directed to the whole body or to
a committee, in thl san mar.ner as arguments are presented to
a court by counsel.
To this end, agreements for the employment of an agent
or to act in the same manrner are valid. But con-
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trvctE rl-ich Ec 1,cyond this line, and stipultite for private
services to be rendered by dealing with individual members,
privately and personally, have been uniformly condemned by
courts of the highest authority. The varieties of such
agreements are very numerous.
In the case of lilarzhall v. B.& O.R.R.Co., 16 Howard, 314,
Grier.J. said, that all contracts for a contingent compensa-
tion for obtaining legislation, or to use personal, or any
secret, or sinister influence on legislators, are void.
Secrecy, as to the character under which the agent or
solicitor acts, tends tc deception, -d is imoral and fraud-
ulent, and where the agent contracts to use such secrecy, or
voluntarily does use it, he cannot have the aid of a court of
equity to recover compensation.
(h). Agreements having a tendancy to corrupt good morals
are contrary to public policy and, therefore void.
-It is enough in this connection to say that all agree-
ments in which the consideration past or future, or the execu-
tory terms stipulating for scts to be done or &rmitted, are
contrary to good morals, are illegal ani void in equity, and
with a very few excc.tions, at the commnon law. This doctrine
-)2-
applies in equity, whatever be the external form of the con-
tract, or its imrmediate purpose, or the oarticulAr nature of
its illegality.
CCP'i1k"'TS , ICL AMIOUNT TO CHALTPERTY OR MAINTENANCE
These being highly tri hal at the common law were
guarded against with a jealous care, but the common law rules
concerning such agreements haVe been greatly modified in the
United Syates, and to a great extent abrogated. As, an
agreement givin- counsel an interast in or a part of the
property to be recovered as a contingent fee for his services
in a litigation id valid. But, contracts stipulating for
the compounding a felomy, the forbearance to prosecute a
crime, or the abandonment of a pending crimnal prosecution
are void with all securities therein.
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CCNSTRUCTIVE FRAUD FROM THE CIRCUL'STANICES AND CONDITIONS OF
THE PARTIES; FOR IT IS AS MUCH AGAINST CONSCIENCE TO TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF A MAN'S VEAKNESS OR NECESSITY AS OF HIS IGNORANCE
The criterion of all such contracts is the want of
a true, legal consent.
(a). Fraud will be inferred in all contracts with idiots
lunatics, and persons of tnsound mind.
In the case of Curtis by Calkins v. Brownell, 42 Mich.,
165; where a mortgage, made by a man who had been insane
some time before and had periodical recu.?rances of insanity,
and was insane at the time he gave the mortsage, though he
had all along managed his own affairs with average correct-
ness and had been treated by his neighbors as competent to do
business, even while they considered him of unsound mind, was
not considered binding and was set aside as being niade while
non compos mentis, though not so manifestily insane as to
make the conduct of the mortgagee fraudulent in making the
bargain which it was meant to secure, even though he had been
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given suf icient warning to :ut him on his -uarld.
(b). 2ut iF one is inca_7 aciotood and the contract is for
his LenIefit, and is *ot tainted with fraud, equity will not
interfere.
In tI( cj- e Selby v. Jackson, 0 Beavan, 102, The court
under the circumstances refused to s 't aside deeds executed
by one under restraint in a lunatio asylum, under medical
certificL:te. When a. *arty, w; ithout authority, but bona fide
assumes the nDoent of the proic~ty of one mientally incom-
petent, the court will not, on his recovery, restore to him
his property without aa~ing an equitable allowance for the
e-penses and liabilities.
On a Lill sekking to ct aside deeds in tote, and praying
no alternative relief, the court will not adversely grant an
accounting on the footing of their validity.
(c). Areements entombed into in good faith and in ignor-
ance of the ental unsounirness of the grantor.
Case of Ashcraft v. DeArmond, 44 Iowa, 220. In this
action it was sought to set aside a conveyanc- on the ground
of the insanity of the Zrantor, snd it appeared tha: the in-
sanity had boo of -low and steady growth, it was held that
evidence reswecing the riental condition of the grantor at a
period subsequent to the time of execution of the conveyance,
was competent, and that rumors in the neighborhood of the
party alleged. to be insane, respecting his mental conditioln
were not admisible in evidenco; and also, that equity will
not interfere to set aside a 1onvcyance, on the ground of
the insanity of the grantor, to one who shall have purchased
in good faith and for value, in ignorare of the mental con-
dition of the grantor.
Cd). Contracts with parties mentally weak are ably dis-
cussed in the case of Allore v. Jewiell, 4 Otto, (U.S.)
Justice Field says, " It is necessary in order to secure the
aid of equity, to prove that the deceased was at the time
insane, or in such a state of mental imbecility as to render
her entirely invapable of executing a valid deed. It is
sufficient to show that, from her sickness and infirmities,
she was at the time in a condition of great mental weakness,
and that there was gross inadequacy'of consideration for the
conveyance."" aiting Harding v. Wheaton, 2 Mason, in which
Justice Story said " Extreme weakness will raisc almost a
necessary presumption of imposition, even when it stops short
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of legal incapacity; and though a contract in the ordinary
course of things, reasonacly made with such a person, might
be admitted to stand, yet if it should appear to be of such
a nature as that such a person could not be capable of meas-
uring its extent or importance, its reasonableness or its
value, fully and fairly, it cannot be that the law is so much
at varia7:ce with common sense as to uphold it."
In same caso C.J.Marshall being quoted " if these deeds
were obtained by the exercise of undue influence over a man
whose mind had ceased to be the safe guide of his actions, i*
is against conscience for hi; who has obtained them to desire
-any advantage from them. It is the peculiar province of a
court of conscionce to 7set them aside."
(e). Where -er.ons in pecuniary distress contract, the
presumption arises that they wverc forced to sacrifice, and
eqViity may under the ciromstances, grant relief.
--Of Distress Produced by Misrepresentation.--
In the case -Z...k.. V. Hidding,. l Txis,50& For what
misrepresentations a conveyance of land will be cancelled.
It may be true in general, that the misrepresentations
for which equity cancels a conveyance of land, are such as
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relate to quantity, quality, situation or value of the proper-
ty, or the pecuniary responsibility of the purchaser, or
something of that nature. But equity does not limit itself
by strict rules and strict definations in matters of fraud.
It leaves the way open to redress wrongs committed by means
of fraud, in whatever forms it may appear.
A misrepresentation producing terror and confusion of
mind, unsettling the judgment, and depriving the party of the
free use of his reasoning faculties, where such misrepresenta-
tion was purposely made in order to take advantage of the
resulting fear and mental derangement, to secure a hard and
unconscionable bargain, it was held to be a fraud in which
equity will relieve, in a proper case. While a sale and
conveyance will not be set aside solely on the ground of in-
adequacy of price, yet such inadequacy, especially if gross,
is evidence of fraud.
The complaint in this case shows that when the plaintiff
conveyed his lands to defendant, he was illiterate and ignor-
ant of business; that he was agitated with fear by reason
of mispepresentations s to his personal peril from the anger
of his neighbors, artfully made to him by the defendant to
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induce him to part with his property for lefs than its value-
that the sale and convey.Cnce wurc made hastily and in secret
giving plaintiff no opp'irtu.;ity to consult with his friends
or counsel; and that the price -aid dfic. not exceed one-third
Of the value of the land. It was held that these averments
show good grounds for'the interposition of a court of cons-
cienee.
(f). Of Intoxication as a ground of relief in a court of
Equity::
The degree of intoxication which merely' exhilerates, and
does not materially affect the understanding and the will,
does not constitute a defnce to the enforcement of an execu-
tory agreement, and much less is it a ground for affirmative
relief.
An habitual drunkard is not necessarily an incompetent
person. An intoxication which is absolute' and complete, so
that the party is for the time entirely deprived of the use
of his reason, and is wholly unable to eomprehend the nature
of the transaction and of his own acts, is a sufficient ground
for settng aside or granting other appropriate affirmative
relief against a convcyanc or other contract made while in
-209-
that condition, (ven in the absence of fraud, procurement, or
undue advantage by the other party. If a person is thus
completely intoxicated, a party openly dealing with him must
of course, perceive his condition; it would secm that the
party knowingly taking the conveyance or contract under these
circumstances was necessarily chargeable with inequitable
conduct.
(g). Transactions Presumptively Invalid between persons
standing in a Fiduciary Relation.
Courts of equity have carefully and wisely refrained
from defining the particular instances of fiduciary relation
in such a manner that other and perhaps new cases might be
excluded.
It is settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that
the principle extends to every possible case in which a fidu-
ciary relation exists as a fact, in which there is confidence
reposed on one side, and the rnsulting superiority and influ-
ence on the other.
The relation and the duties involved in it need not be
legal; it may be moral, social, domestic, or merely personal.
Ih the foregoing illustrations there has leen an actual
undue influenc,, cono o io.ely i nad designedly exerted upon a par-
ty who was p'eculiarly susce-tible to such external pressure,
on account of his mental weakness, old age, ignorance, necess-
itous condition, ,n' the like...
The existence of ary fiduciary relation was unnecessary
and irmaterial.
The undue influence being established as a ft any con-.
tract obtained or other transaction accom-plished by its means
is voidable, -nd is set aside without the rnccssary aid of
any presumption. The single circumstances now to be con-
sidered is the existence of some fiduciary relation, some
relation of confidence existing between two parties without
the element of mental weakness, old age, ignorance, or pecu-
niary distress; if any 6f the latter elements exist they
will simply exist incidentally and not necessarily; there
need be no intentional concealment, no misrepresentation, no
act of fraud.
The doctrine to be examined arises from the very concep-
tion and existence of a f'iducivry relation. Equity admits
the locality of certain bona fide transactions between the
parties, yet, because every fiduciary relation implies a
condition of superiority held by oie of the parties over the
other, in all transactions betweon them, by which the superior
party obtains a posuible benefit. Equity raises a presumpt-
ion against its validity, and casts upon that part the bur-
den of -roving affirmatively the compliance with equitable
requisites and of thereby overcoming the -resumption.
One principle underlies the whole subject in all its ap-
plications; and this -rihciple is stated in both a negative
and in an affirmative form. Its negative signification
is mos aptly put, in a recent decision by a most able judge:
The broad principle on which the court acts in cases of
this description is, that wherever there exists such a confi-
dence, of whatever character that confidence may be, as enab-
les the person in whom confidence or trust is reposed to
exert influence over the person trusting him, the court will
not allow any transaction between the parties to stand,
unless there has een the fullest and fairest explanation and
communication of every particular resting in the breast of
the one who seeks to establish a contract with the person so
trusting him."
The principle was affirmatively stated with equal
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accuracy in the Eane case on appeal, as follows; " The
jurisdiction exercised by courts of equity over the dealings
of persons standing in certain fiduciary relations, has al-
ways 'cel regarded as one of the most salutary description.
The principles applicable to the more fnmiliar relations of
this charcctor have been long settled by many well-known de-
c-isions, but the courts have always been careful not to fetter
this useful jurisdiction by defining the exact limits of its
exercise.
Vvherevcr --wo personsst in such a relation that,
while it continues, confidence is necessarily reposed by one,
and the influence which natuvally grows out of that confidence
is possessed by the other-, and this confidence is abused, or
the influence is exerted to obtain an advantage at the expense
of the confiding party, the person so availing himself of his
position will not be permitted to retain the advantage,
although the transaction could not have been impeached if no
such confidential relation had existed."1/
Cowce v. Cornell, 71 N.Y.,91, is an excellent illustra-
tive case in this relation -- Mr. Cornell deceased was the
grandfather of Mr.Strong who wLs looking after and managing
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his grandfather's business Which was quite extensive as the
old gentleme was a very wealthy nan. Mr. Stvong after a
while exprossed a desire to cater into business for himself
and be independent, of his grandfather. It appcars that the
old gentleman bore the expenses of his own household and
those of his grandson also. That , r.Strong was furnished a
dwelling house next to that of his aged ancestor.
Mr.Cornell persuaded his grandson to abndon his idea of
going into business for himself, and to continue the manage-
ment of his own affairs, at the same time stating that there
Tas money enough for them all.
I- 'o-io l expressed a de sire to compensate his sons
kindness, by mraing some change in his will, but his lawyer
advised him to leave the will as it then stood and make the
cdmpensation in some other manner. By virtue of this legal
advice, Mr.Cornell executed a promissory note favor of his
grandson for $20000, and this action is brought to have the
notc set aside and doeclared void on the -rounds of old age of
the maker ahd the circumstances pointing to undue influence,
together with the enormous amount named therein as compensa-
tion. But the court held that the grandfather could place
any-estimate on the value of the -randson's services he chose
and that no arts or stratogem whatover are shown in the evi-
dence against the young -,an, and hence the element .of con-
structive fraud is wanting to vitiate the validity of the note.
.7':-
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ALL FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS AGAINST THIRD PERSONS VWIO ARE NOT
PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT ARE COGNIZABLE IN A COURT OF EQUITY.
This proposition may be illustrated in the case where a
composition is made by a debtor with his creditors upon the
basis of his payment to all who join in the transaction the
same proportionate share of their claims and of being there-
fore discharged by them from all further liability, a secret
agreement by the debtor with one of the creditors for the
latter's joining in the composition, whereby the debtor pays
or secures to the favored creditor a furthe: sum of money or
amount of property, or -reater advantage than that received
an-' shared Llike by all the others, is a Fraud u)on such
other creditors, and is voidable.
If the agreement be executory, it cannot be enforced
agrinot th; d-tor in equity or at lia; the security may be
set aside by a court of equity, and the amount paid by the
debtor in pursuance of the contract nay be recovered back by
him.
The relief, decfensive or affirmative, thus given to the
debtor does not rest upon any considerationof favor due and
shown to him, but wholly upon motions of policy, to protect
the rights of the other creditors, and to secure them against
such frauds.
Law'rence v. Clark, 70 W.Y., 128, was a case where a
party in raking a composition with his creditors, secretly
entered into an agreement with one of them and made a promis-
sory note in his favor as an inducement to him to enter into
such composition; the note was hold as void as oeing a fraud
against the other creditors. The stnme is true if the note
is given by . third person not the debtor, and any amounut can
be recovered back when so p;aid. Solinger v. Earle,82 N.Y.393.
In Larney v. -ailey,43 !dd.,!O, The rule is laid down as
follows:: In a composition agreement a debtor professes to
deal with *:.l1 creditors entering .it on terms of perfect
equality, and a secret agreement giving a crecditor an undue
advntae vitiates the agreement as reing a fraud upon the
otbr ocior , who may sue for and recover the full amount
of their original indebtodn.ss, less the amount they have
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received under the com.position, and it is not essential that
the composition agreeer.t should first be rescinded, and the
money recovered under it be returrned.
This would seem to be the just nd equitable effect of
such a secret bargain upon the rights cf the composition
creditors.
Argall v. Cook, 43 Conn.,160, holds that the fact of a
debtor intonding to pay certain of the creditors joining in a
composition deed, in full, out cf hi future earnings, does
not invalidate the composition as to other creditors, if
there is no agreement tending to defraud them.
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EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE TIP BULWARK CF INDIVIDUAL
PROTECTION AND TMIMEFORE OF CIVIL LIBERTY.
I have endeavored to origintate the great liberal
principles possessed by. the Court of Equity and not possessed
by any other system of jurisprudencu, and trace this liberty
through successive cases, which liberality I shall dominate
the influence of Christianity upon a vigorous and technical
set of forms and custoris.
By virtue of' litei-aiity or Christian influenct the
aged are rade younl- again, so far as protection is concerned;
the infant is made to have discretion and understanding; the
weak-minded are given strength and even the lunatic is in
some respects restored to consciousness and is treated as
having a sound and disposing mind and memCry.
The strong man also is protected rEnd made to see and
understand where he did not before realize the situation, by
reason of doccit, fraud, mistake, accident or undue influence.
Wonderful and vastly important was this change.
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"There is no business in which men now engage which
has crone through such changes in the past century as the
Practice of law.
S'cnc of the blue laws of the ducking stool age may remain
unnoticed ?n the statute books, and the old common law-forms
may hold a precarious footin7 in the courts of a few states,
but the real currcnt of business runs in a different channel.
Evolution has a -hinin- eaz..le in our courts.
Once a Court of Equity had a very narrow jurisdiction,
and if a thing was le'c:al all of ,vicked intent could shelter
themselves under the law.
Once the practioo was so complicated by antiquated and
inconsistent forms that the wisest was often lost in its
verbiage.
But all this has assed away under a better civilization.
F INIS.

